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Title:
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| Number: | 05-27 |
| Author: | |
| Issue Date: | August 2005 |
| Abstract: | In
many real-world contests, players can influence their chances of
winning through two or more activities or "arms". In this paper, we
analyze the equilibrium properties of a two-player two-armed contest,
and compare them to those of a standard two-player one-armed contest.
Several interesting results arise. For example, in the case of
symmetric players, we find that rent dissipation doubles when the
second arm is introduced. In general, if neither player is more than
twice as efficient as the other with the second arm, more rent is
dissipated in the two-armed contest than in the one-armed contest. We
also derive conditions under which total effort with the first arm
decreases when the second arm is allowed into play, and under which
both players would agree not to use their second arm. |
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