Emory University
Department of Economics
Working Papers


Title:
Number: 05-24
Author:
R. Preston McAfee, Hugo Mialon and Sue Mialon
Issue Date: August 2005
Abstract: The antitrust laws are intended to permit procompetitive actions by firms and deter anticompetitive actions. We consider firms’ incentives to use the antitrust lawsuits for strategic purposes, in particular to prevent procompetitive efficiency-improvement by rival firms.  Our main result is that, ceteris paribus, smaller firms in more fragmented industries are more likely to use the antitrust laws strategically than larger firms in concentrated industries.

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